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Econometrica, Vol. 65, No. 1 (January, 1997), 19-57 
RATIONAL ASSET PRICING BUBBLES 
BY MANUEL S. SANTOS AND MICHAEL WOODFORD' 
This paper provides a fairly systematic study of general economic conditions under 
which rational asset pricing bubbles may arise in an intertemporal competitive equilibrium 
framework. Our main results are concerned with nonexistence of asset pricing bubbles in 
those economies. These results imply that the conditions under which bubbles are possible 
-including some well-known examples of monetary equilibria-are relatively fragile. 
KEYWORDS: Asset pricing bubbles, rational expectations, sequentially incomplete mar- 
kets, money. 
THIS PAPER IS CONCERNED with the conditions under which asset prices in an 
intertemporal competitive equilibrium are equal to the present value of the 
streams of future dividends to which each asset represents a claim. According to 
a central result of the theory of finance, this is very generally true in the case of 
economies with trading at only a finite sequence of dates, as long as there are no 
restrictions upon transactions other than that associated with possible incom- 
pleteness of the set of securities that are traded. (The result is sometimes called 
"the fundamental theorem of asset pricing.") Here we consider the extent to 
which such a result continues to be valid in the case of trading over an infinite 
horizon. 
It has often been observed in the econometric literature on "asset pricing 
bubbles" that it is possible, in principle, for the price of a perpetuity and the 
dividends on that security to satisfy at all times a present-value relation for 
one-period holding returns, while the security's price nonetheless does not equal 
the present value of the stream of dividends expected over the infinite future. In 
such a case, the price of the perpetuity is said to involve a bubble component.2 
Joint stochastic processes for which this component is nonzero are sometimes 
argued to characterize existing assets; for a recent example, see Froot and 
Obstfeld (1991). But such an inference depends upon aspects of the stochastic 
IThis article is a drastic revision of an earlier, more extensive draft. We would like to thank Buz 
Brock, Douglas Gale, Takashi Kamihigashi, an editor, and two anonymous referees for helpful 
comments, and the Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (Rio de Janeiro) and the Bonn 
Workshop in Mathematical Economics for their hospitality while part of this work was completed. 
We would also like to acknowledge financial support from DGICYT (Spain) under Grant No. 
PS900014, from NSF (U.S.A.) under Grants Nos. SES-89-11264 and SES-92-10278, from Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 303, and from Gottifred-Wilhelm-Leibniz- 
Forderpreis. 
2For expositions of this familiar idea, see, e.g., Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Ch. 5), or Broze and 
Szafarz (1991, Sec. 2.3.4). 
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20 M. S. SANTOS AND M. WOODFORD 
processes that are inherently difficult to determine with finite data samples. 
Hence, clarification of the conditions under which such phenomena are theoret- 
ically possible is likely to play an important role in judgements about whether 
they are observed. 
It has been known since the work of Scheinkman (1977, 1988) and Brock 
(1979, 1982) that at least in certain simple kinds of infinite-horizon economies, 
involving trading by at most a finite number of infinitely lived households, asset 
pricing bubbles are not possible in an intertemporal equilibrium. The argument 
is, essentially, that the existence of a bubble would require asymptotic growth in 
the value of the asset in question, and hence asymptotic growth of the wealth of 
at least one of the households, at a rate inconsistent with optimization by that 
household. Here we seek to extend this result to a much more general class of 
intertemporal equilibrium models. In particular, we wish to consider the issue in 
a framework general enough to include such possibilities as the kind of 
economies treated by Scheinkman and Brock, while also including types of 
economies known to allow bubbles as an equilibrium phenomenon under at 
least certain circumstances, such as the overlapping generations model treated 
by Tirole (1985) or the type of monetary economy considered by Bewley (1980). 
Our framework for analysis is an intertemporal general equilibrium model 
involving spot markets for goods and securities at each of a countably infinite 
sequence of dates. Thus we depart from the methods of analysis of much of the 
literature on intertemporal general equilibrium theory, which assumes that all 
dated and contingent future goods are traded for one another in a single 
market. This is because the phenomenon that we wish to consider is only a 
possibility if a security's exchange can always conceivably be due to its expected 
exchange value in another market in the future, rather than having solely to 
depend upon the value of the future goods to which it represents a claim.3 We 
also allow for potentially incomplete securities markets, that is, for cases where 
there are not even sequentially complete markets in the sense introduced by 
Arrow. This complicates the definition of the "fundamental value" of an asset; it 
also allows for bubbles in additional types of cases. Likewise, we allow for 
incomplete participation of households in the entire sequence of spot markets, 
so that our framework can treat standard overlapping generations models. 
Finally, we allow for a reasonably general specification of borrowing constraints, 
to encompass in our analysis both the kinds of models with infinitely lived 
3The meaning that we attach to the term "bubble" is thus different from the senses in which this 
term is used by Gilles and LeRoy (1992, 1993). For us, a "pricing bubble" exists when the price of an 
asset differs from the value (in a sense to be clarified in Section 2) of the stream of dividends to 
which it is a claim. Thus it is neither a property of the valuation operator for such dividend streams, 
nor a property of the dividend streams; and indeed, when pricing bubbles are possible in our 
framework, it is possible in equilibrium for two securities representing claims to identical dividend 
streams to have different market prices. (See Tirole (1985) and Example 4.1 below.) The relation 
that may exist between the conditions that exclude "bubbles" in the Gilles-LeRoy senses and those 
that exclude bubbles in our sense remains an open question. 
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households previously considered by Scheinkman and Brock on the one hand, 
and those considered by Bewley on the other.4 
Our intertemporal equilibrium framework is described in Section 1. In Section 
2, we then discuss the meaning of the "fundamental value" of a security, and 
hence what it means for there to exist a "pricing bubble." Here we reconstruct, 
in our framework, certain aspects of the Kreps (1981) theory of the extent to 
which arbitrary dividend streams can be priced, given price processes for certain 
traded securities, simply from consideration of the prices consistent with nonex- 
istence of opportunities for pure arbitrage profits. The existence of an infinite 
horizon requires fundamental modification of that theory; for example, it is no 
longer true, simply because a market price exists for a security giving rise to 
exactly a dividend stream, that the dividend stream must be assigned that price. 
These developments of arbitrage theory over an infinite horizon are the basic 
tools of our analysis in Section 3. In this section, we establish our main results 
regarding nonexistence of pricing bubbles in an equilibrium with the property 
that the economy's aggregate endowment has a finite value. These results are 
discussed further in Section 4, through the presentation of examples that 
illustrate the need for various of our assumptions. While several cases are 
analyzed in which equilibrium pricing bubbles are possible, our general results 
imply that these examples, including the well-known examples of monetary 
equilibria mentioned earlier, hold only under rather special circumstances. 
Section 5 concludes. 
1. THE MODEL 
We consider an infinite-horizon economy with homogeneous information and 
sequential trading. Trading occurs at each information set (or node) in the 
information structure N. Each information set in N is dated with one of the 
discrete sequence of dates t = 0, 1, 2.... We use the notation st to denote one 
of the information sets that may be reached at date t. Each information set st 
has a unique immediate predecessor, which we will denote st - 1, that is dated 
t - 1. There is a unique initial information set so, the only one dated 0. Each 
node has a finite number of immediate successors. We use the notation STISt to 
indicate that the node 5T belongs to the subtree whose root is st, i.e., that either 
5T = St or St is a predecessor of 5T. 
At each node st e N, there exist spot markets for n(st) consumption goods and 
k(st) securities, where both of these are finite numbers. The set of households 
which are able to trade in the markets at node st is denoted by H(st); this is a 
subset of the countable set of households H that make up the economy. We 
allow for the possibility of incomplete participation at some nodes so that we 
can treat cases such as overlapping generations models. Let Nh denote the 
4Kocherlakota (1992) emphasizes the role of the different types of borrowing constraints in 
accounting for the difference between the possibilities of speculative bubbles in the two types of 
models. His analysis, however, is concerned with necessary conditions for the existence of asset 
pricing bubbles, and applies only to economies with no uncertainty. 
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subset of N consisting of nodes at which household h can trade, for any 
household h E H; st E Nh if and only if h E H(st). Then a household is infinitely 
lived if for any date T, there exists some st e N h with t > T; otherwise, the 
household is finitely lived. 
We make the following assumptions about market participation. For each 
h E H, let Nh c Nh denote the (possibly empty) subset of Nh consisting of 
terninal nodes for h, i.e., nodes after which h no longer trades. (To be precise, 
St E Nh means that if 5Tj5t for some T > t, then 5T 0 Nh.) We then assume: 
(i) for each h eH, if stENh stN Nh, and Ss . then st+1 ENh; and 
(ii) for each St E N, there exists at least one h E H for which St E Nh \Nh. 
Assumption (i) states that a household that trades at St either trades at none 
of the successors of St (if it is a terminal node for that household), or trades at 
all of the immediate successors of St (if it is not a terminal node). This 
eliminates ambiguity about the type of securities that households can trade with 
one another at a given node. Assumption (ii) guarantees that the entire 
economy is connected. 
The securities that are traded are defined by a current vector of prices, q(st), 
and the returns they promise to deliver at future information sets. These returns 
are specified by an n(st) x k(st - 1) matrix d(st), and a k(st) x k(st - 1) matrix 
b(st), defined for each node St with t > 0. A household that chooses to hold a 
portfolio z e&Mk(st 1) at the end of trading at node St - 1 then obtains a vector 
of goods dividends d(st)z and a vector of securities b(st)z if information set St 
is reached. This allows us to treat general multi-period securities. Among other 
cases, we may consider trading in fiat money, a security m such that 
dim(st) = 0 for all i, all St with t > 0, 
bjm(st) = 0 for all j ] m, all st with t > 0, 
bmm(st) = 1 for all st with t > 0. 
We may also consider bonds that promise future payments of money, if money 
itself is one of the traded securities. 
We also assume that there is free disposal of every security that is purchased. 
In order for this assumption to make sense in general circumstances, we require 
that at each St E N with t > 0, d(st), b(st) > 0. Thus the stream of dividends to 
which any security represents a claim is nonnegative in all goods at all informa- 
tion sets, and the future securities to which any security represents a claim are 
also a nonnegative vector (with, accordingly, a nonnegative market value). 
Each household h e H(s0) enters the spot markets at s? with an initial 
endowment of securities zh(50). The net supply of securities at each node 
st, Z(st), can then be defined recursively as 
Z(S0) = E Zh(50), 
h EH(s0) 
z(st) = b(st)z(st - 1). 
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In the case that H(s?) is an infinite set, we require that initial securities 
endowments be such that the sum in the first line is well-defined (and finite). 
There is then a well-defined and finite net supply of securities in all periods. We 
assume that z(s?) 2 0, though individual households may have negative initial 
endowments. This implies that z(st) 2 0 at all nodes, so that all securities are in 
either zero or positive net supply. 
We can now determine the stream of future dividends associated with any 
given security. For all srlst with r > t, let the k(sr) x k(st) matrix e(srlst) be 
defined recursively as 
e(s'l s') = Ik(,t), 
e(srlst) = b(Sr)e(sr - 115t), for all Srlst, r > t. 
Then for all srlst with r > t, let the n(sr) x k(s) matrix x(srlst) be defined as 
x(srlst) = d(Sr)e(Sr - 1st ). 
We may then say that the portfolio z of securities held at the end of trading at 
node st represents a claim to a stream of dividends, namely, the vector x(srlst)z 
for goods at each node SrISt with r > t. 
A security j traded at st is of finite maturity if there exists a date T such that 
eij(srIst) = 0 for all i, all SrISt with r 2 T. Otherwise, the security is of infinite 
maturity. Fiat money, defined above, is an example of a security of infinite 
maturity, even though dim(st) = 0 for all i and all st. 
At each node st E Nh, each household h E H(st) has an endowment of 
consumption goods wh(st) eg<(s'). We furthermore suppose that the economy 
has a well-defined (and finite) aggregate ndowment 
W(st) = E Wh(St) > 0 
h E H(st) 
at each node st. Considering the goods that are real dividends on securities in 
positive net supply, the economy's aggregate goods supply is then given by 
w(st) w(st) + d(st)z(st - 1) 2 0. 
(In this definition, the final term is zero if t = 0.) 
Each household is assumed to have preferences represented by an ordering 
> h, defined on its consumption set 
Xh = rl Mgn(st) 
ste Nh 
That is, it is defined for all consumption plans involving nonnegative consump- 
tion goods at each node St e Nh. For simplicity, the consumption set extends 
over all goods in the information set where an agent can trade. This hypothesis 
can be weakened to allow for more general or alternative settings. It is 
nonetheless essential for our results that consumption sets be bounded below so 
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as to place an upper bound on the total amount of goods that can be sold at a 
given information set. 
We make the following monotonicity assumption regarding preferences: 
(A.1) For each h E H, the relation > h is nondecreasing on Xh, and strictly 
increasing in the consumption of some good traded at each node St E Nh. 
Our results are strengthened if we postulate a further joint assumption on 
preferences and endowments, implying a sufficient degree of impatience. 
For any vector ch E Xh and any node St ENh, we can write Ch= 
(ciL(St), ch(st), c^(St)), where c- denotes the coordinates of ch indicating con- 
sumption at nodes other than the subtree of nodes 5T E Nh such that sTlst, and 
ch(st) denotes those indicating consumption at nodes ST e Nh such that STISt 
and T > t. Then for some results we also require: 
(A.2) For each h E H, there exists 0 < yh < 1 such that for any st E Nh, 
(hC (St), Ch(St) + 7(St), ych (St)) > hch 
for all consumption plans satisfying ch(sT) w(sT) at each T- Nh, and all 
h 
Here >_ h denotes strict preference. Note that the consumption plans to 
which (A.2) refers include all those that are associated with feasible allocations 
of resources. Also note that yh may be different for each h e H, and that we do 
not require that the collection {7h} be bounded away from 1. This kind of 
uniform impatience is also assumed by Levine and Zame (1994) and Magill and 
Quinzii (1994). In the case of finitely lived households, (A.2) must hold if 
preferences are described by any continuous utility function, and is thus innocu- 
ous in that case. In the case of infinitely lived households, the assumption is less 
trivial, though it is satisfied in the case of any continuous, stationary, recursive 
utility function that discounts the future (see Santos and Woodford (1993, Sec. 
6) for a precise statement), and thus in many familiar models. Example 4.5 
below considers a (product continuous) preference ordering for an infinitely 
lived household that does not satisfy (A.2). 
Household h chooses, at each node ste Nh, an n(s9)-vector of assumption 
goods Ch(St), and a k(s0-vector of securities zh(St) to hold at the end of 
trading, subject to the budget constraints: 
(1.1a) p(St)'Ch(St) + q(st)'zh(St) <p(St'Wh(St) +R(st)'zh(st - 1), 
(1.1b) ch(St) 0, 
(1.10) q(stf Zh(St) 2 -B h(St). 
Here, p(st) denotes the n(st)-vector of goods prices in the spot market at node 
St, q(st) denotes the k(st)-vector of securities prices, and 
R(st) =p(stf)d(st) + q(stY)b(st) 
denotes the k(st - 1)-vector of one-period retums if node st is reached. 
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Condition (1.la) is just the standard Arrow-Radner budget constraint for an 
economy with sequential trading. If t > 0, but household h does not trade at 
s'-1, (1.la) has the same form, but with zh(St -1) = 0. If t = 0, (1.la) takes the 
special form 
(l1.laa) p(SO)'Ch(SO) +q(s0)'zh(S5) <p(SO?)Wh(SO) ( o)' h(SO). 
Condition (1.lb) restates again the lower bound on the consumption set. 
Condition (1.lc) specifies a limit on the extent to which household h can finance 
consumption at node st by borrowing. The quantity Bh(st) indicates a house- 
hold specific borrowing limit at node s', assumed to be nonnegative. We may 
suppose in general that the borrowing limit depends upon equilibrium prices; 
examples of such dependence are discussed in Section 4. But because we are not 
concerned here with issues related to the existence or uniqueness of equilib- 
rium, or how an equilibrium changes when some parameters of the economy are 
perturbed, we do not need to model explicitly the dependence of Bh upon 
(p, q).5 In the characterization of equilibrium that we give here, we simply 
suppose that household h takes the sequence of borrowing limits {Bh(st)} as 
given, just as it takes the prices as given, and our only general assumption 
regarding the nature of the borrowing limits is that Bh(st) 2 0 for each house- 
hold h at each node st and that Bh(st) = 0 for st E Nh 
If the matrix V(st), which has one row corresponding to R(st+ ') for each of 
the nodes st+ 5st, has a rank equal to the number of rows (the number of 
immediate successor nodes), we say that there exist complete markets at node st. 
Otherwise, securities markets are incomplete. Complete markets obviously re- 
quires that the number of securities traded at st be at least as large as the 
number of immediate successor nodes. In general, complete markets is a 
property of a particular equilibrium, rather than that of the specification of the 
economy. 
Let an economy with sequential trading be specified by an information 
structure N, a set of households H, the participation sets {Nh}, the securities 
processes {b(st),d(st)}, the initial securities endowments {Zh}, the endowment 
processes {wh(st)}, the preferences a h over consumption sets Xh, and the 
functions defining the borrowing limits {Bh(st)}, given price processes 
{p(st), q(st)}. Then the processes {p(st), q(st), ch(st), zh(st)} describe an 
Arrow-Radner equilibrium if: 
(i) for each h E H, the processes {Ch(St), h(st)} are optimal under the 
preferences _ h, subject to budget constraints (1.1) being satisfied at each 
5See Hernandez and Santos (1994), Levine and Zame (1994), and Magill and Quinzii (1994) for 
treatments of existence of equilibrium in infinite-horizon economies with incomplete markets and 
borrowing limits. The existence of an equilibrium generally requires further assumptions on 
preferences, endowments and borrowing limits. Such assumptions are not needed for our results on 
the pricing of securities in a given equilibrium. 
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stE Nh, given prices {p(st), q(st)} and the borrowing limits {Bh(st)} resulting 
from them; 
(ii) for each st e N, 
(1.2a) p(st) > O, 
(1.2b) q(st) > O; 
(iii) for each st E N, 
(1.3a) E ^s)<ws) 
h eH(st) 
(1.3b) E Zh(St) <z(st); and 
h E H(st) 
(iv) for each st e N, 
(1.4a) p(St)'[ EH) th(S) - W(st)j = 0, 
h E=-H09t 
(1.4b) q(st)[ E H h()t) Z(St)] = 0. 
h E- H09t 
Here, (1.2a-b) are equilibrium requirements as a result of free disposal. Note 
that the sum in (1.3a) and (1.4a) is necessarily well-defined (as consumption 
must be nonnegative for each household), so that we can say unambiguously 
whether the conditions are satisfied. The same is not true of the sum in (1.3b) 
and (1.4b). Nonetheless, we take it to be part of the definition of equilibrium 
that if H(st) is an infinite set, then the portfolios chosen are such that the 
aggregate portfolio demand is well defined. 
In the sequel we shall only consider equilibria in which every st in N has the 
property that R(st+ lIst) 0 0 for some st lst; that is, in which there exists some 
way of carrying wealth into some successor. This avoids discussion of a number 
of technicalities (taken up in Santos and Woodford (1993)). In particular, it 
eliminates the possibility of a particular kind of pricing bubble that can in any 
event occur only under quite pathological circumstances. In the absence of other 
comment, we will always understand "equilibrium" to refer to one of this kind. 
2. PRICING BY ARBITRAGE AND THE VALUE OF A DIVIDEND STREAM 
This section provides a complete characterization of the possible valuations of 
an arbitrary income stream of wealth in our infinite horizon framework under 
conditions of no arbitrage. Then attention is focused on the relation that must 
exist between the price of a security and the value of the stream of dividends to 
which it represents a claim, and on certain assumptions that guarantee the 
existence of a finite-valued aggregate wealth. As a step toward this end, we first 
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derive certain basic properties concerning prices and one-period returns of 
different securities if there are to be no pure arbitrage profits available. 
Given the price processes (p, q), we say that no arbitrage opportunities exist at 
node st if there is no z E.!Mk(s') satisfying the conditions 
R(st+)'z 0 for all st+15t, 
q(st)'z <0 
with at least one strict inequality. 
As is well known from the theory of finite-horizon Arrow-Radner equilibria, 
this is necessarily true at any node st e N in any equilibrium if there are no 
borrowing limits at that node. We now observe that the presence of borrowing 
limits (1.lc) does not change this result, at least in the case of equilibria in which 
R(st+ lst) > 0 for some st'+1st; for in such case one likewise shows that a given 
household could obtain an arbitrary amount of wealth in at least one state 
without committing further expenditure in the remaining nodes. 
As is familiar from the finite-horizon theory, the nonexistence of arbitrage 
opportunities at node st implies the existence of a set of state prices a(st) > 0 
and {a(st?)} with a(st?) > O for all st+1Ist, such that 
(2.1) a(st)q(st)' E a(st+l)R(st+l)'. 
St+ list 
This well-known result is a consequence of the Minkowski-Farkas Lemma (see, 
e.g., Duffie (1988, p. 71)). It should be obvious that only the ratios a(st+ ')/a(st) 
are restricted by (2.1); hence the existence result for each node st individually 
allows us to define some state-price process {a(st)} for the entire information 
structure such that (2.1) holds. We use A(st) to denote the set of such processes 
for the subtree with root 5t.6 In the case that there are complete markets at st, 
(2.1) uniquely determines the ratios a(st?+ D/a(st) for each St+ 1 st, while if there 
are incomplete markets, there are not a sufficient number of linearly indepen- 
dent conditions in (2.1) to uniquely determine them. 
Such a set of state prices provides an obvious way of evaluating a future 
stream of consumption goods. For any nonnegative stream of resources {x(st)}, 
specifying an n(st)-vector of consumption goods x(st) > 0 at each node St E N, 
any positive goods price process {p(st)}, and any positive state-price process 
a EA(st), one can define the present value at St of the subsequent resource 
stream, with respect to this particular state-price process, as 
1 m0 
vx(st; p, a)- 1 a(sT)p(5T )Ix(sT) 
a(st T=-t+l s Tst 
6There is an extensive related work on the existence of "martingale measures" in infinite 
dimensional spaces under conditions of "no arbitrage." Schachermayer (1994) reviews some of this 
work and provides an extension of these results to an infinite-horizon framework. 
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This is clearly a meaningful expression, though the sum may diverge (in which 
case we say that vX = + x). Note, however, that the present value need not be 
uniquely defined, except in the case of complete markets. 
Similarly, for any state-price process a eA(st), 
1 00 
(2.2) f(s; p, a)' 
- , a(sT)p(s ) Ix(sTlst) 
as)T=t+1 s TISt 
defines a k(st)-vector of fundamental values for the securities traded at node st. 
Observe that the fundamental value is defined only with reference to a particu- 
lar state-price process. Some properties of the fundamental value are, however, 
true regardless of the state prices chosen. 
PROPOSITION 2.1: At each St E N, the vector of fundamental values defined in 
(2.2) is well-defined for any a e A(st), and satisfies 
0 ?f(st) < q(st). 
PROOF: Equation (2.1) may be written 
a(st)q(st) = E a(st+ l)p(st+ I)'x(st+ I1st) 
St l ist 
+ E a(st+1)q(st+1l e(st+1 Ist). 
St+ I 5t 
Repeated application of this equation yields 
T 
a(st)q(s= E E a(ST)p(ST)'X(sTlst) 
T=t+1 sT1St 
+ , a(sT)q(sT)'e(sTIst) 
sTIst 
A~~~~~~ 
for any horizon T > t. But e(sTlst) ? 0, which together with (1.2b) implies 
A 
(2.3) a(st)q(stY ? E E a(sT)p(sTY x(sTlst). 
T=t+1 5T1St 
Since x(sTIst) ? 0 for all ST, the right-hand side of (2.3) is a nondecreasing 
series in T. Because of (2.3), the series is bounded above, and so must converge 
to a limit no greater than the left-hand side. Q.E.D. 
Note that the assumption of free disposal is used to guarantee (2.3). In the 
absence of free disposal, neither the bound nor the convergence need obtain, 
even if a security is a claim to a positive flow of goods. (See Brock (1990) and 
Santos and Woodford (1993, Example 5.4).) 
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We can correspondingly define the vector of asset pricing bubbles as 
a(5t) -q(st) -f(st) 
for any a E A(st) for securities traded at st. It follows from the proposition that 
this vector is well-defined and necessarily satisfies the bounds 
0 < or (st) < q(st). 
We thus obtain in a quite general setting the often-remarked "impossibility of 
negative bubbles" (e.g., Diba and Grossman (1988), Blanchard and Fischer 
(1989, Ch. 5)). Substituting this definition and (2.2) into (2.1), we get 
(2.4) a(st)u(st)'= E a(st+?1)(st+?lYe(st+?lst) 
f+ 11st 
Hence, we also find in this context that any vector of asset pricing bubbles must 
satisfy a (generalized) martingale property. In particular, (2.4) implies that if 
there exists a nonzero pricing bubble on any security at date t, there must exist a 
bubble as well on some securities at date T, with positive probability, at every 
date T > t. Furthermore, if there exists a bubble on any security in positive net 
supply, then there must have existed a bubble as well on some security in 
positive net supply at every predecessor of the node st; there is thus a clear 
sense in which a bubble can "never start," in a rational expectations equilibrium 
with free disposal. 
One case in which (2.2) results in an unambiguous definition of the funda- 
mental value, even with incomplete markets, is that of a security of finite 
maturity. In such case, the fundamental value of a given security j, defined as in 
(2.2), is the same for all state-price processes a E A(st), and the uniquely 
defined fundamental value is fj(st) = qj(st), so that there is no pricing bubble 
for this security. (The proof of this assertion simply repeats that of Proposition 
2.1, taking T to be a date far enough in the future so that ej(sTlst) = 0 for all 
ST st and xJ(sTlst) = 0 for all ST15t with T > T.) 
In the case of securities of infinite maturity in an economy with incomplete 
markets, the fundamental value need not be the same for all state-price 
processes consistent with the available securities returns. But even in this case, 
we can at any rate define the range of variation in the fundamental value, given 
the restrictions upon possible state prices implied by observed securities prices. 
Let {x(st)} again be a nonnegative stream of resources. Then at any node St we 
may define 
x(st)-SUp -q(st)'z(st) 
where the supremum is over all plans {Z(Sr)} for the nodes Srlst, r > t, such that: 
(i) the plan {Z(Sr)} satisfies 
(2.5) p(sr)x(sr) + R(sr)Yz(sr - 1) 2 q(Sr)'z(Sr) 
for all srlst, r > t; and 
(ii) there exists a date T such that q(sryz(sr) ? 0 for all srist with r 2 T. 
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In other words, zr(st) represents the least upper bound for the amount that 
can be borrowed at node st by a household whose endowment is {X(Sr)} at all 
subsequent nodes, if the borrowing limits (1.lc) are ignored, but the household 
must hold nonnegative wealth at all nodes after some finite date. This is a way of 
assigning a lower bound to the present value, at node st, of a claim to dividends 
{X(Sr)} at all subsequent nodes. 
Similarly, at node st we may define 
Wxt) -inf q(sWYz(s) 
where the infimum is over all plans {Z(Sr)} for the nodes Sr Is', r > t, such that 
(2.6a) R(Sr)Yz(Sr - 1) p(Sr)'X(Sr) + q(Sr)Yz(Sr), 
(2.6b) q(Sr)YZ(Sr) 2 0, 
for all srIst, r > t. Essentially, i7r(st) represents a greatest lower bound for the 
amount of wealth needed at node st in order to be able to purchase a 
consumption stream equal to the process {X(Sr)} at all subsequent nodes, if the 
household must hold nonnegative wealth at all nodes from st onward. 
These bounds represent a lower and an upper bound, respectively, for the 
present value of the nonnegative stream of resources {X(Sr)}.7 This is shown by 
the following basic result. 
PROPOSITION 2.2: Let {X(Sr)} be a process satisfying X(Sr) ? 0 at each Sr I s, and 
let ii(st) and (st) be defined as above. Then 
(2.7a) 7r(st)= sup v,(st; p, a), 
a EA(st) 
(2.7b) ,j(st) < inf v,(s';p,a). 
a EA(st) 
Suppose furthermore that 
_(Sr) < + oo for all SrjSt. (For this it suffices, because of 
(2.7b), that there exists a state-price process a E A(st) such that vx(st; p, a) < + oo.) 
Then 
(2.7c) 7T(st) = inf v,,(st; p, a). 
a EA(st) 
The proof is given in the Appendix. The possible failure of (2.7c) in the 
absence of additional hypotheses is illustrated by the following example. 
EXAMPLE 2.1: Let N consist of so and two date t nodes, (t and mt for each 
t 2 1. Node so has two immediate successors (l and mj; every other node has 
only one immediate successor (the successor of 6, being , + 1, and of qt being 
7Our definitions of these bounds, as well as the characterization in Proposition 2.2, are in the 
spirit of those in Kreps (1981), although we cannot directly apply Kreps' results, due to certain 
differences in our set-up, such as our restriction of the consumption set to the nonnegative orthant. 
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?). AThere is a single consumption good at each node, which we choose as 
numeraire (p(St) = 1 for each st). One security is traded at each node, and 
q(st) = 1 for each st, R(st) = 1 for each st with t ? 1. Clearly there are no 
arbitrage opportunities at any node. Consider the value of a resource stream 
given by x(t) = 0, x(iit) = 1/2, for all t ? 1. 
In this example, 'the set of state-price processes a e A(s0) is the set of 
processes of the form 
af(edlaWs?) = a for all t > 1, 
a(Gdt)/a(so) = 1- a for all t > 1, 
for arbitrary 0 < a < 1. In the case of any such process, v,(,q,; p, a) = + oc for all 
t ? 1, and so v,(s0; p, a) = +oo as well. Thus 
inf v (s0; p, a) = + oo. 
a EA(s0) 
On the other hand, it is easily seen that M(so) = 0. Any portfolio trading plan 
with z(s?) < 0, that is feasible apart from the borrowing limits, would have to 
involve z( t) < 0 for all t > 1, so that there is no finite date at which wealth 
becomes nonnegative. Therefore, (2.7b) is satisfied in this example, but (2.7c) 
fails at the initial node so. This does not contradict Proposition 2.2, because in 
this case fx('t) = +oo for all t 2 1. 
Thus for any state-price process, and any security j traded at st, the funda- 
mental value, defined as in (2.2), must lie between the bounds ff,,(st) and 
7rxj(st), where xi refers to the dividend process {xi(srls}t). These are further- 
more the tightest bounds with this property. For it follows from Propositions 2.1 
and 2.2 that the bounds Jj(Sr) and ITX (sr) are finite, and satisfy 
V (Sr) < 
- 
J(Sr) < q (Sr ej( Sr|St) < +oo 
at all srlst. Hence (2.7c) applies in the case of a dividend stream {xi(SrlSt)}. 
In the event that yxi(st)= FIst), the fundamental value is uniquely defined. 
This is necessarily true in the case of complete markets, but can also occur with 
incomplete markets. On the other hand, with incomplete markets it is possible 
that the two bounds do not coincide. In such a case, the fundamental value may 
be different for different values of the state-price processes. Hence the existence 
or not of a pricing bubble may be ambiguous. There unambiguously exists no 
bubble if Z,(st) = 7Tx,(st) = qj(st); and conditions under which this must be true 
in equilibrium, even with incomplete markets, are given in Theorem 3.3. 
Likewise, there unambiguously exists a pricing bubble if xj(st)<qj(st). But 
these two cases are not the only possibilities, in the case of incomplete markets. 
If ,7r (st) < 77rx(st) = q1(st), the existence or not of a bubble depends upon which 
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of the state-price processes a E A(st) one chooses.8 Conditions are given in 
Theorem 3.1 for the latter equality to hold, which do not preclude the inequality 
holding as well; and Example 4.5 illustrates this possibility. 
Before turning to a further analysis of the bubble component of securities 
prices, it is useful to define a particular type of borrowing limit that will be used 
subsequently. One may say that borrowing is limited only by one's ability to 
repay out of one's future endowment if 
(2.8) Bh(st) = Xh(St) 
for each st E Nh \Nh. These are the tightest borrowing limits with the property 
that any plan satisfying (1.la)-(1.lb) at all nodes, and such that there exists a 
date T after which wealth is always nonnegative, is permissible. It can be shown 
that, even in the case of incomplete markets, such borrowing limits never bind 
(effectively) at any finite date. Thus they represent a constraint only upon the 
asymptotic behavior of a household's debt, and indeed it can be shown to be 
equivalent to the kind of "transversality condition" used to define the budget 
constraint of infinitely lived households by authors such as Scheinkman (1977, 
1988) and Brock (1979, 1982). In the case of finitely lived households, these 
borrowing limits are equivalent to imposing no borrowing limits at all nontermi- 
nal nodes.9 An important consequence of this specification is the following. 
PROPOSITION 2.3: Suppose that household h has borrowing limits of the form 
(2.8). Then the existence of an optimal plan (rh, zh) for the price processes (p, q) 
implies that irWh(st) < + oo at each st E Nh, so that there is a finite borrowing limit 
at each node. Furthernore, the borrowing limit can equivalently be expressed as 
Bh(st) = inf vwh(st; p,a) < +oo. 
a EA(st) 
Thus borrowing limits of this kind represent an obvious generalization, to the 
case of incomplete markets, of the familiar "present-value budget constraint" 
for the case of complete markets. One reason that this result, proved in the 
Appendix, is of interest is that the present value of a household's endowment 
must be finite, at least for some possible definitions of the present value, in any 
equilibrium; this will prove useful in Section 3. 
The above bounds on fundamental values also allow us to extend to the case 
of incomplete markets the notion of an equilibrium in which the aggregate 
endowment of the economy has a finite value, a case known to be of special 
8To be precise, Proposition 2.2 implies only that if iij(st) = qj(st), there exists a state-price 
process a eA(st) in terms of which the bubble component of the price is arbitrarily small; it need 
not be possible to make it zero, as A(st) is not closed. But Theorem 3.1 gives sufficient conditions 
not simply for W.,j(st) to equal qj(st), but for there to exist a state-price process in terms of which 
fj(st; p, a) = qj(st), as shown by explicit construction of the state prices. 
9See Levine and Zame (1994), Magill and Quinzii (1994), and Santos and Woodford (1993, Sec. 2) 
for further discussion of the properties of borrowing limits of this kind. 
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interest in the theory of infinite-horizon economies with complete markets (see, 
e.g., Wilson (1981)). We will say that the aggregate endowment is bounded by a 
portfolio trading plan if irW(st) < + oo for all s e N. In the case of complete 
markets at every node, this condition is equivalent to a finite value for the 
aggregate endowment, if it is priced using the unique state-price process; this is 
a simple consequence of Proposition 2.2. In the case of incomplete markets, it 
implies a finite value regardless of the state-price process used, and indeed a 
bounded value for all positive state-price processes. We have stated the defini- 
tion in terms of the aggregate endowment {w(st)}, which is not the aggregate 
supply of consumption goods in general. The aggregate supply of goods is 
instead given by {wi(st)}, where wi(st) = w(st) + d(st)z(st - 1) for all st. with 
t > 0, and wv(s?) = w(s?). However, it readily follows from (2.3) and (2.7a) that 
irW(st) < +oo if and only if 1 (s t) < +oo. 
The definition of this condition involves the spot price process (p, q). We can, 
however, state conditions relating only to the specification of an economy that 
imply that in any equilibrium the condition must hold. The following is a simple 
example. 
LEMMA 2.4: Suppose that there exists a portfolio 2 +) such that 
(2.9) x(stlsO)i 2 w(st) 
for all st E N with t > 0. Then in any equilibrium the aggregate endowment is 
bounded by a portfolio trading plan. 
Note that condition (2.9) does not say anything about the initial net supply of 
securities z(s?)-it is only necessary that 2 represent a portfolio that can be 
purchased in the spot markets at so. The proof is simple. In any equilibrium, 
p(st) 2 0, q(st) ? 0, x(stlsO)2 ? 0, and e(stls0)2 ? 0 for all st. Then consider the 
portfolio trading plan defined by A(st) = e(stls0)i for all st. For any node st, this 
together with the plan x = w satisfies conditions (2.6) for all STISt. It then 
follows immediately from the definition of -r that 
-7w(st) < q(s0)e(stjs?)2" < + oo. 
The case of an aggregate endowment that is bounded by a portfolio trading 
plan seems to be of considerable interest on empirical grounds. Abel et al. 
(1989) show that for several advanced industrial economies, the difference 
between gross returns to capital and gross investment, considered as a fraction 
of gross national product, appears to be consistently bounded above zero. In 
terms of our notation, this means that observations are consistent with the 
supposition that for some k > 0, 
(2.10) D(st ) 2 kP(stf4v(st) 
for all st, where D(st) denotes the difference between the returns to capital and 
investment at node s5. Now suppose that claims to the aggregate capital stock 
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are among the set of traded securities.10 At any node st, let 2(s9) ? 0 denote the 
portfolio consisting of a claim to the aggregate capital stock. Then consider the 
consumption/portfolio trading plan that consists of holding at each node 
k-Z^(s'), and consuming at each node the aggregate goods supply iw(st). Given 
(2.10), this plan satisfies conditions (2.6) for all st with t > 0, and involves a 
nonnegative portfolio at each node. It then follows that jjO(st) < k-lq(st9`(st) 
< + 00 at each st E N, so that xw(st) < + mo as well. Hence the empirical support 
for the Abel et al. criterion suggests that the case of an aggregate endowment 
bounded by a portfolio trading plan is of considerable practical importance.11 
As a simple illustration of why the condition is important, we offer the 
following result. 
PROPOSITION 2.5: Let preferences satisfy (A.1) and consider an equilibrium 
{p, q, &h, 2h}. For any node st E N, let {c7(Sr)} be the vector of bubble components 
for the securities traded at each node Sr1St, when fundamental values are defined 
using state prices a E A(st), and suppose that vw(st; p, a) < + oc (and hence 
v,,(st; p, a) <+oo) when these state prices are used. Suppose furthernore that there 
exists a nonzero bubble on some security in positive net supply traded at st, so that 
aJ(st)'z(st) > 0. Then for any K< +oo, there exist a date T and a node STlst at 
which 
(TY Z (ST) > Kp(5T ) (5T) 
That is, there is a positive probability that the total size of the bubble component on 
all securities in existence becomes an arbitrarily large multiple of the value of the 
aggregate supply of goods in the economy. 
The proof of this proposition simply follows from the basic observation that by 
the martingale property of pricing bubbles (equality (2.4)) we must have that 
a(st)o(stYz(st) = Es TI ta(sT)Df(sT)Yz(sT) remains constant for all T > t, whereas 
'0 We can represent an economy with capital and production in terms of our framework by taking 
the production plan as given, rather than something to be determined. We also replace household's 
labor endowments at each node with a share of output at that node, of value equal to their wages in 
the production economy, and replace the firm sector with a perpetuity whose "dividends" at each 
node equal the aggregate output not used for investment purposes, net of the shares of output 
imputed to households in replacement of their wages. If there are nonproduced inputs other than 
labor, they are dealt with similarly: the part of households' endowments of these materials that are 
used in production are replaced by a share of output of value equal to the factor payments in the 
production economy. Then D(st) is the value of the dividends at node st on this perpetuity. The 
necessary conditions for an equilibrium of the endowment economy so constructed are among the 
necessary conditions for an equilibrium of the original production economy. In fact, our results 
extend rather directly to production economies, but we do not take this up here. 
"Note, however, that the Abel et al. criterion could hold, without the aggregate endowment 
being bounded by a portfolio trading plan, if not all capital goods are traded, and the incompleteness 
of markets is such that no portfolio can replicate the returns on the aggregate capital stock. See 
Blanchard and Weil (1992) for an example. 
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E TI5ta(sT)p(sT)v(sT) converges to zero, as T goes to + 0, since vv(st; p, a) < 
+ 00. 
3. MAIN RESULTS 
As one might expect from Proposition 2.5, a finite value for the aggregate 
endowment severely restricts the class of cases in which pricing bubbles on 
securities in positive net supply are possible at all. This is because some 
household or households must accumulate vast wealth in such an equilibrium as 
the value of their consumption goes to zero. It is not obvious, however, that such 
behavior is inconsistent with optimization in our intertemporal framework with 
incomplete markets, borrowing limits, and incomplete participation of agents in 
the entire sequence of markets. Indeed, Example 4.5 illustrates that for some 
state-price processes pricing bubbles may arise in an equilibrium of a simple 
economy with a representative consumer. Our most general result is the 
following. 
THEOREM 3.1: Let preferences satisfy (A.1), and consider an equilibrium 
{p,q,ch,jh}. For any steN, suppose that - (st)< +oo. Then there exists a 
state-price process a EA(st) such that qj(sT) =f(sT; a, p) for all STISt, for each 
security j traded at ST that is either (a) of finite maturity or (b) in positive net supply 
(i.e., for which zj(sT) > 0). 
Thus, under the hypotheses of the theorem, there are, in a certain sense, no 
speculative bubbles, except possibly on securities that are both of infinite 
maturity and in zero net supply. On the other hand, this theorem does not assert 
that there is an unambiguous fundamental value for any security in positive net 
supply; it implies that qj(sT)= "X(ST) for any such security, but it does not 
exclude the possibility that qj(sT)> j1(ST), so that there also exist state-price 
processes a e A(s') in terms of which the market price of the security exceeds 
its fundamental value. 
A case in which Theorem 3.1 implies an unequivocal result is the following. 
COROLLARY 3.2: Suppose that one of the securities traded at each node st E N is 
fiat money (defined in Section 1), and consider an equilibrium satisfying the 
hypotheses of Theorem 3.1 at all nodes. Then fiat money has no value in this 
equilibrium; i.e., qn(st) = 0 for each st E N. 
This follows directly from the theorem, for the fundamental value of fiat 
money is zero at all nodes, regardless of the state prices used to compute 
present values. 
Theorem 3.1 can be strengthened if one assumes a sufficient degree of 
impatience. 
THEOREM 3.3: Let preferences satisfy (A.1) and (A.2), and consider an equilib- 
rium {p, q, &h, 2h}. For any node st E N, assume that there exists a state-price 
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process a e A(st) such that v (st; p, a) < + cc when these state prices are used. 
Then q.(sT) =f.(sT; a, p) for all sT5st, for each securityj traded at ST that is either 
(a) of finite maturity or (b) in positive net supply (i.e., for which zj(sT) > 0). 
This result is an improvement of Theorem 3.1 in two respects. First of all, if 
7ir(st) < + oo, then given the stronger assumption on preferences it follows that 
there unambiguously exist no bubbles regardless of the state prices chosen, since 
for all such state-price processes, qj(sT) =j(ST). And second, it extends the 
class of cases for which bubbles do not exist. It is now sufficient that vw(st; p, a) 
be finite for some state-price process, rather than it having to be true for all sets 
of state prices consistent with the values of traded securities. 
These theorems apply to a broad class of economies in which the equilibrium 
value of the aggregate goods supply is bounded. We now give two simple sets of 
restrictions upon economic primitives that guarantee applicability of the theo- 
rems in any equilibrium. Both results apply regardless of the possible incom- 
pleteness of markets. 
COROLLARY 3.4: Let preferences satisfy (A.1) and suppose that there exists a 
porfolio z satisfying (2.9) for all st with t > 0. Then for any equilibrium { p, q, 1h, 2h} 
there exists a state price process a E A(s0) such that the conclusions of Theorem 3.1 
hold. If in addition preferences satisfy (A.2), then these conclusions hold for every 
state-price process a EA(s0). 
This result follows directly from Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, making use of Lemma 
2.4. It should be pointed out that if preferences do not satisfy (A.2), a pricing 
bubble may exist in terms of some state prices; this is illustrated by Example 4.5 
below. This corollary implies that well-known examples of models that allow for 
valued fiat money, such as the overlapping generations model of Samuelson 
(1958) or the consumption-smoothing model of Bewley (1980), no longer admit 
monetary equilibria if additional markets are opened for securities of the kind 
assumed in the corollary.12 
COROLLARY 3.5: Let preferences satisfy (A.1) and (A.2), and suppose that there 
exist an infinitely lived household h E H and e > 0 such that (i) wh(st) 2 eW(St) 
for each st ECl N, and (ii) the borrowing limit Bh(st) is specified by (2.8). Then for 
any equilibrium {p, q, ch, 2h}, there exists a state-price process a (A(s0) such that 
the conclusions of Theorem 3.3 hold. 
This result follows from Theorem 3.3, making use of Proposition 2.3. By the 
proposition, there must exist some state-price process a EA(s0) in terms of 
which v h(S0; p, a) < + oo. By assumption, wh ? ew. Hence, vw(so; p, a) < + oo as 
12On the possibility of monetary equilibria when such markets are closed, see Examples 4.1, 4.2, 
and 4.4 below. 
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well. Consequently, a E A(s) is a state-price process for which the theorem 
applies. 
Note that (A.2) is not needed for such a result to hold in the case of complete 
markets. For if the state prices a eA(s') are unique (up to normalization of an 
arbitrary a(s?) > 0), Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 then imply that 7iwh(so) < + oo, so 
that Theorem 3.1 applies. Nor is it necessary, in the case of complete markets, 
that there be a single household whose endowment satisfies hypothesis (i) of the 
corollary. It suffices that there be a finite collection H of households, each with 
borrowing limits given by (2.8) and for each of whom Nh has a finite number of 
root nodes (nodes with no predecessors), such that the aggregate endowment of 
the households in H satisfies hypothesis (i). For then Proposition 2.3 implies 
that for each h E H and for each root node sr of Nh, VWh(sr; p, a) < + oo in 
terms of the unique state-price process a. Summing over all root nodes of Nh 
for each h E H, and summing over all h e H, yields a finite number for the 
aggregate endowment of the group, and hence for the aggregate endowment of 
the economy. Then Theorem 3.1 applies.'3 
Corollary 3.5 implies that monetary equilibria necessarily cease to exist in an 
overlapping generations model, if there exists a family whose successive genera- 
tions are linked by altruistic bequests, and so behave like a single infinitely lived 
household (as argued by Barro (1974)), if that family controls at least a fraction 
e > 0 of total resources at all dates, and the family is able to borrow against its 
future endowment income. The corollary similarly implies that monetary equi- 
libria are not possible in the model of Bewley (1980), if some household type has 
endowment bounded away from zero in all states, and that household's borrow- 
ing limit is of the form (2.8). This shows the extent to which Bewley's monetary 
equilibria depend upon restrictions on borrowing limits.'4 
The proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 both build upon a strategy that has 
previously been used in the context of economies with complete markets (e.g., 
Brock (1979, 1982), Scheinkman (1977, 1988), and Wilson (1981)). The essential 
idea is the following. As shown in Section 2, if there is a bubble on a security in 
positive net supply, then the net present value of aggregate wealth at date T 
does not approach zero as T is made unboundedly large. On the other hand, if 
there is a finite upper bound on the value of aggregate consumption (given by 
the finite bound on the value of the aggregate endowment), the present value of 
consumption from date T onward must tend to zero as T is made large. Thus if 
there is a bubble, for a date T sufficiently far in the future, the present value of 
some household's wealth exceeds that of its subsequent consumption; but this 
can be shown to be inconsistent with optimization by the household even with 
incomplete markets and borrowing limits. Of course, in the case of incomplete 
markets an added difficulty appears, as present values are not unambiguously 
defined. 
13This last result generalizes one of Wilson (1981). 
14Example 4.4 provides a counterexample to Corollary 3.5, and depends upon every household 
type having a zero endowment in some states. 
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Crucial preliminary results thus establish bounds upon the amount of wealth 
that households can hold, consistent with optimization, determined by the value 
of planned future consumption. In proving Theorem 3.1, we rely upon the 
following. 
LEMMA 3.6: Let preferences satisfy (A.1), and consider an equilibrium 
{p, q, ch, 2h}* Then for any st E N and any h e H(st), 
(3.1) q(st)'2h(St) < ? h_,h)+(St) 
where (=c- wh)?(sT) max( h(sT)-wh(sT),O) for all Is with T> t. 
The proof is given in the Appendix. This result does not immediately give a 
bound for aggregate wealth in terms of the present value of aggregate consump- 
tion, if there are incomplete markets, for the upper bound 7r defined in Section 
2 is not a linear operator. Nonetheless, we may establish the existence of such a 
bound, if present values are computed using the right state prices. The following 
result is used to prove Theorem 3.1. Again, the proof is given in the Appendix. 
LEMMA 3.7: Let the hypotheses of Theorem 3.1 be satisfied. Then for any St E N 
and any 0 < 8 < 1, there exist a state-price process ii e A(st) and a date T > t such 
that 
T 
(3.2) , E ai(sr)p(sr ) jEc(sr)] 2 5a(st)q(st) z(st). 
r=t+ 1 ss'rL h E H(sr) 
In proving Theorem 3.3, we rely upon the following stronger version of 
Lemma 3.6, that is possible under the stronger hypothesis on preferences. 
LEMMA 3.8: Let preferences atisfy (A.1) and (A.2) for h E H. For given prices 
(p, q), let (rh, 2h) be an optimal plan for h, where jh(St) < w(st) for each st E Nh. 
Then for any st E N, and any state-pnice process a e A(st) for which vw(st; p, a) < 
+ oc, one must have 
00 
(3.3) E E a(sr)p(srYZh(sr) ? a(st)VW(st;p, a) +a(st)q(s) h(st) 
r=t+ 1 srIst 
Sre Nh 
where the last term is zero if st t Nh. 
This too is proved in the Appendix, which also contains the proofs of 
Theorems 3.1 and 3.3. Observe that in the case of complete markets inequality 
(3.3) is a simple consequence of (A.1). Example 4.5 illustrates, however, that 
unless further assumptions are imposed on preferences, inequality (3.3) will not 
hold for every feasible state-price process a EA(st). Also, note that the bound 
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(3.3) can be summed over households, to obtain an upper bound upon aggregate 
wealth in terms of the present value of aggregate consumption, and that this 
bound holds for any state prices in terms of which the aggregate endowment has 
a finite value. This accounts for the stronger results obtained in Theorem 3.3. 
Finally, observe that the stronger assumption (A.2) is not needed in order for 
the conclusion of Corollary 3.5 to hold, in the case of a representative house- 
hold. In this simple case, Lemma 3.6 suffices to provide a bound on the value of 
aggregate wealth, since aggregate wealth is just the wealth of the representative 
household. 
4. EXAMPLES OF RATIONAL ASSET PRICING BUBBLES 
The nonexistence results for pricing bubbles in the previous section depend 
upon a number of assumptions. In this section, we demonstrate the importance 
of these assumptions by presenting a number of examples, in which rational 
asset pricing bubbles do exist, when one or another of the assumptions are 
violated. 
Our first example shows that a pricing bubble is possible if no household is 
endowed with a positive fraction of the aggregate endowment, even when all 
other hypotheses of Corollary 3.5 are satisfied. This is also a simple example of 
an equilibrium with valued fiat money. 
EXAMPLE 4.1: Here we recall the overlapping generations model of fiat 
money of Samuelson (1958) and Gale (1973).15 There is no uncertainty, so that 
the information structure is a sequence of dates t = 0, 1, 2.... There is a single 
consumption good at each date, which we will take to be the numeraire for that 
date's spot markets. There is also a single security traded at each date, fiat 
money, defined by d(t) = 0, b(t) = 1, for all t 2 1. Because fiat money has a 
positive exchange value in every period in the equilibrium described below, 
there are complete markets. 
The economy consists of a countably infinite sequence of households h= 
0, 1, 2, .. ., and NO = {0}, Nh = {h - 1, h} for each h 2 1. Household 0 seeks to 
maximize its consumption at date 0, while each household h ? 1 seeks to 
maximize U(ch(h - 1), Ch(h)). Here U(-,) is a strictly concave C1 function, 
strictly increasing in both arguments, defined on _4 2. The endowment of 
household 0 is w2 > 0 at date 0, while the endowment of each household h 2 1 
is w1 > 0 at date h - 1 and w2 > 0 at date h. Household 0 has an initial 
endowment of one unit of fiat money (the initial net supply), while each 
household h 2 1 has none. Finally, the borrowing limits for each household are 
of the form (2.8), which is to say, at each date t, Bt(t) = 0, Bt+ l(t) = w2q(t)/q(t 
+ 1), given equilibrium prices such that q(t) > 0 for all t. Note that such an 
economy satisfies all hypotheses of Corollary 3.5 except for (i). 
15The significance of this model as an example of a rational asset pricing bubble is stressed by 
Tirole (1985). 
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Let us assume in addition that the partial derivatives, U1(, w1 + w2)> 
U2(0, w1 + w2), U1(w1, w2) < U2(w1, w2).16 Then there exists a rational expecta- 
tions equilibrium in which q(t) = q* for each t 2 0, where q* > 0 is the unique 
quantity such that 
Ul(w- q*I W2 + q*) = U2(w ,-q*I W2 + q*) 
The equilibrium consumption allocation is ch(h - 1) = w, - q* for each h > 1, 
h(h) = w2 + q* for each h > 0, and the equilibrium portfolio allocation is 
2h(h - 1) = 1, 2h(h) = 0 for each h 2 1. Note that fiat money has a positive 
value despite the fact that its fundamental value is uniquely defined and equal 
to zero. 
Now suppose instead that two types of fiat money are traded at each date, 
defined by d(t) = 0, b(t) = I2, for each t > 1; and let household 0 have an initial 
endowment of one unit of each tvpe of money. In this case, one possible 
equilibrium has q1(t) = q*, q2(t) = 0 for each t> 0, with the same consumption 
allocation as above. This shows that two securities with identical dividend 
streams may nonetheless have different prices. More generally, there exists an 
equilibrium for every pair of nonnegative numbers q1(t) = q1 and q2(t) = q2 for 
each t ? 0, such that q1 + q2 = q*, and with the same consumption allocation as 
above. (This is an example of the indeterminacy of equilibrium exchange rates 
discussed by Kareken and Wallace (1981).) This indeterminacy of the relative 
size of the "bubble components" of the prices of the two assets is an example of 
something that would be missed in using a formalism like that of Gilles and 
LeRoy (1993), that attributes the "bubble component" to the presence of a 
''payoff at infinity" in the security specification. 
It is often asserted that "short horizons" for traders make rational bubbles 
possible, that would be eliminated if traders were concerned about returns that 
could be realized farther in the future.17 Overlapping generations models do 
allow the existence of equilibria with bubbles under certain circumstances where 
they would be excluded in the case of an infinitely lived household, or even in 
the case of a finite number of households. (Recall the discussion after Corollary 
3.5.) But the features of the overlapping generations structure that are crucial in 
such examples are that different households have very different endowment 
patterns and that the economy is not sufficiently productive (i.e., the aggregate 
allocation is not bounded by a portfolio trading plan) and not the fact that 
households can trade, or care about consumption, in only a finite number of 
periods. 
Our next example shows that a pricing bubble is possible if borrowing limits 
are not of the form (2.8), even when all other hypotheses of Corollary 3.5 are 
16These assumptions ensure that we have what Gale (1973) calls the "Samuelson case." 
- 17See, e.g., the remarks of Stiglitz (1990). The contrast between the results of Tirole (1982) for an 
economy with infinitely lived traders and those of Tirole (1985) for an economy with overlapping 
generations of two-period lived households is sometimes interpreted in this way. 
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satisfied. In this example, the lower bound lTj(st) = + oo, and in fact there exists 
valued fiat money, and this is possible because for each household the borrowing 
limits effectively bind infinitely often. 
EXAMPLE 4.2: Here we recall a monetary model of Bewley (1980), discussed 
in detail in Sargent (1987, Ch. 6). This is a deterministic model with a single 
consumption good at each date, and fiat money is the only security traded at 
each date. The economy consists of two households, h = 1,2, each of which 
trades at all dates (Nh = N), and each of which seeks to maximize 
00 
Uh(Ch) = E I3tU(Ch(t)) 
t=O 
where 0 < ,3 < 1 and u(-) is a bounded, strictly increasing, strictly concave C1 
function, defined on M+. The endowment of household 1 is w1 > 0 at all 
even-numbered dates and w2 > 0 at odd-numbered dates, while the endowment 
of household 2 is w2 at even-numbered dates and w1 at odd-numbered ones. 
Household 2 has an initial endowment of one unit of fiat money (the initial net 
supply), while household 1 has none. Finally, the borrowing limits for each 
household are given by Bh(t) = 0 for all t ? 0. 
Let us assume in addition that u'(0) > /u'(w1 + w2), u'(w1) < /u'(w2). Then 
there exists an equilibrium in which q(t) = q* for each t 2 0, where q* > 0 is 
the unique quantity such that 
u'(w -q*) ) 3U'(W2 + q*) 
The equilibrium consumption allocation is Ch(t) = Wl - q* when h = 1 and t is 
even, or h = 2 and t is odd, and Ch(t) = W2+ q* when h = 1 and t is odd, or 
h = 2 and t is even. The equilibrium portfolio allocation is jh(t) = 1 when h = 1 
and t is even, or h = 2 and t is odd, and 2h(t) = 0 when h = 1 and t is odd, or 
h = 2 and t is even. Again, fiat money has a positive value despite the fact that 
its fundamental value is zero. 
Note that the economy satisfies all the assumptions of Corollary 3.5 except for 
(ii). In this case the borrowing limits bind for household 1 at every odd date, and 
for household 2 at every even date, and so both households are unable to 
borrow against the value of their future wealth. Indeed, in this equilibrium, 
E a(t)wh(t) = +00 
t=O 
for each household, and as a result the proof of Theorem 3.3 fails since 
v.= +00. This would not be possible if borrowing limits are of the standard 
form (2.8). (But see Example 4.4 below.) 
Even when the conditions of Theorem 3.1 (or its corollaries) are satisfied, 
speculative bubbles are not excluded on securities of infinite maturity in zero 
This content downloaded from 128.59.154.119 on Mon, 25 Nov 2013 12:59:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
42 M. S. SANTOS AND M. WOODFORD 
net supply. The following example illustrates this possibility for an economy 
satisfying the hypotheses of Corollary 3.4. 
EXAMPLE 4.3: Again there is no uncertainty and a single consumption good at 
each date. There is a single security traded at each date, a perpetuity defined by 
d(t) = d > 0, b(t) = 1, for all t ? 0. The economy consists of two households, 
h = 1, 2, with the same preferences and market participation as in Example 4.2. 
Endowments are given by wh(t) w > 0 for h = 1, 2, and for each t ? 0. House- 
hold 1 has an initial endowment of 1 unit of the bond, while household 2 has an 
initial endowment of -1 units. Thus the bond is in zero net supply; we may 
regard it as a liability of household 2 issued at some previous date, and held by 
household 1 at the beginning of period 0. We assume that w > d, so that 
household 2 can pay the stream of dividends promised. The borrowing limits for 
each household are of the form (2.8), or equivalently (since there are complete 
markets), they are unambiguously defined by the present value of future wealth. 
The following process describes an equilibrium for this economy: 
q(t) - 1 d + K-t 1 -13 
cl(t) = w + 3d + (1 - )K, 
j2 (t) = w 
-1d - (1 - 3)K, 
_ 
_ (132d/l-13) + Kg 
(13d/1- 13) + K3-t' 
22(t) = -21(t). 
Each expression holds for each t 2 0, and K is a constant in the interval 
0< K < (w - 13d)/(l - 3). (The lower bound is necessary in order to ensure 
that q(t) 2 0 for all t; the upper bound is necessary in order to ensure that 
?2(t) 2 0 for all t.) In the case of any such equilibrium, the unique state-price 
process is given by a(t) = 13 t, as a result of which the uniquely defined funda- 
mental value of the bond equals ( 13/(1 - 13))d. Hence there unambiguously 
exists a pricing bubble in the case of any K> 0. 
We could introduce trading in a one-period bond each period, that is in zero 
net supply, without changing any aspect of the above equilibrium. If the 
one-period bond pays one unit of the consumption good a period later (d2(t) = 1, 
b2(t) = 0 for all t 2 1), its equilibrium price is q2(t) = 13 for all t 2 0. Yet even 
with a second bond, the existence of a speculative bubble on the perpetuity does 
not imply the existence of an arbitrage opportunity. This is true even though 
each household trades at the entire infinite sequence of dates. It is not possible, 
for example, to sell short A units of the perpetuity, consume KA, and invest 
(,3/(1 - 13))dA in the one-period bond, paying the dividends upon the shorted 
perpetuity in all subsequent periods out of the funds invested in the one-period 
bond (that are rolled over each period). The problem with such a plan is that it 
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reduces the market value of the household's portfolio, q(t)'z(t), by an amount 
KAf,-t at each date t. This must violate the borrowing limit (2.8) for large 
enough t. 
It is also worth remarking that if we allow modifications in the net supply of 
securities after date 0 (e.g., due to government issuance or retirement of 
securities), then existence of a speculative bubble under circumstances like 
those of this example requires only that the security be in asymptotically zero net 
supply. Thus, for example, a positive value for fiat money is possible, with a 
positive money supply at all dates, if the quantity of money in the hands of the 
private sector contracts to zero asymptotically."8 
Our examples thus far have all involved complete markets. Incomplete 
markets do, however, make possible some qualitatively distinct phenomena. The 
following example shows that even with a finite number of agents and borrowing 
limits of the form (2.8), a speculative bubble is possible in the case of incomplete 
markets. The example thus illustrates the necessity of condition (i) in Corollary 
3.5. 
EXAMPLE 4.4: We present here a variant of a monetary economy analyzed by 
Kehoe, Levine, and Woodford (1992). At each date t, there is realized a random 
state st E { , }. This follows a Markov process with 
Prob (st+1 = Ist = 71) = Prob (st+ 1 = 7)1st = ) =T 
where 0 < 7r < 1, given an initial condition so E { , 7}. A node st E N can then 
be identified with a sequence {So, S1,... , Stj IE{, 71}t+ . There is a single con- 
sumption good at each node, and a single security is traded, fiat money (again in 
fixed net supply of one unit at all dates). 
The economy consists of two households, h = 1,2, each of which has prefer- 
ences of the form 
00 
(4.1) E E7T(St)j3(st)u(c(st)) 
t=O St 
where ir(st) is the unconditional probability of node st, and 13(st) = f3t is the 
discount factor, assumed to be time stationary and the same for both house- 
holds, with 0 <,3 < 1. The (non-state-contingent) single period utility function 
u(c) is likewise the same for both households. The function u: + >-* is a 
strictly increasing, strictly concave, bounded C1 function. The endowment of 
household 1 is 0 if the current state st = 6, and w > 0 if the current state st = ; 
the endowment of household 2 is w > 0 if st = 6 and 0 if st = q. Thus the 
aggregate endowment is always w > 0. One household is initially endowed with 
18For instance, see the "hyperdeflationary" equilibria in Woodford (1994). That paper considers 
an economy with a cash-in-advance constraint, but "hyperdeflationary" equilibria exist in which the 
constraint never binds, and corresponding monetary equilibria exist for a model with no such 
constraints. 
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one unit of money, and the other with zero units; which household is which does 
not matter. Finally, both households have borrowing limits of the form (2.8). 
Because there is always a positive probability of receiving zero endowment in 
each of the next T periods, for arbitrarily large T, it is obvious that Hrwh(St) = 0 
for h = 1, 2, and each st E N, as long as fiat money has positive value for all 
St E N. This is the kind of equilibrium that we consider. Hence borrowing is 
never possible (Bh(st) = 0 for h = 1, 2 and each st E N), though these borrowing 
limits are of the form (2.8). 
We suppose furthermore that 
:32X(1 - V) u'(w) _ __T (4.2) < ~ (X) (- j) +,8(l -,8,) u' () 1 -,8+,6v 
This condition defines a nonempty interval of possible values for u'(w)/u'(0), all 
of which are less than one (as is required by the strict concavity of u(-)). 
We can then show that the following processes describe a rational expecta- 
tions equilibrium with valued fiat money. Let q*, q** be the unique quantities 
satisfying 
u'(q* ) 1 - /3 +f317 
u'(w - q*)q (4.3b) q** = ( 
Note that (4.3a) has a unique solution 0 < q* < w, given the second inequality in 
(4.2). Then (4.3b) has a unique solution for q** as well; also, the concavity of 
u(-) implies that q** > q*. In the equilibrium, for each node st E N, t ? 1: 
(i) if St = g and St_ = , J'(St) = 0, C2(St) = W, '1(St) = 0, 22(St) = 1, q(st) 
(ii) if St = 6 and St1 = q, 1(st) =q* 2(St) = w - q*, 21(St) = 0, 22(St) = 1, 
q(st) = q*; 
(iii) if st = 7 and st -= , '(st)= w - q*, 2(St) = q* 1(t) =1 1 22(St) = 0, 
q(st)=q*; and 
(iv) if St= r and Sl = 1 jl(St) =W, Z2(St) = 0, fl(St) 1, Z2(St) = 0, q(st) 
For t = 0, the same rules apply, but the clause "if st1 = " is replaced by "if 
z2(sO) = 1,,, and the clause "if St- 1 = I7" by "if 21(s0) = 1.,, 
In other words, in this equilibrium, at the end of trading at each node, the 
entire money supply is held by the household that had a positive endowment at 
that node; the household with no endowment spends during the period any 
money that it holds at the beginning of the period. The exchange value of money 
is -q* if the household that holds the entire money supply at the beginning of 
the period is the household with zero endowment, while it is q** if the 
household with the money has endowment w. At any time, equilibrium is 
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completely determined by the current distribution of money holdings and the 
current distribution of endowments, and those two quantities evolve as a 
finite-state Markov chain. 
It is obvious that the situation just described satisfies the budget constraints 
and market clearing conditions. It remains only to demonstrate that it repre- 
sents optimal consumption/portfolio behavior for each household, given the 
equilibrium price process {q(st)}. For the sake of brevity, this exercise is omitted 
here. We refer the reader to our previous paper (Santos and Woodford (1993)), 
where we exhibit a system of Lagrange multipliers that satisfy the standard 
Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions, which in our concave problem are sufficient 
for the existence of an optimal plan. Thus, these processes define an equilib- 
rium. 
Observe that the existence of a finite number of households does not imply 
that ITW(st) < + oo for all st. In this case the value of the aggregate endowment is 
infinite when valued using any state prices satisfying (2.1). (This is not acciden- 
tal, as all other assumptions of Theorem 3.3 hold true here, and that result 
would otherwise imply the nonexistence of a pricing bubble in such an economy.) 
Of course, this is equally true of Example 4.2. What is different here is that with 
incomplete markets monetary equilibria are possible even with borrowing limits 
of the form (2.8). For each household, ZWh(St) < + oo, by Proposition 2.3. But the 
particular state prices that make the present value of household l's endowment 
finite imply an infinite value for the present value of household 2's endowment, 
and vice versa. This is possible only because of boundary endowments and 
incomplete markets. 
All of our previous examples have been cases in which a pricing bubble 
unambiguously exists. In each case, the "fundamental" value of the security in 
question has been unequivocally defined, either because of the existence of 
complete markets, or because the security is fiat money. But in the case of 
incomplete markets, the "fundamental" value need not be unambiguously 
defined. The following example illustrates this possibility, in the case of an 
economy satisfying the hypotheses of Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.4. 
EXAMPLE 4.5: Again there is realized a random state st E { ,  1} at each date 
t 2 1. In the present case, we assume that this random variable is independently 
and identically distributed at each date, with 
Prob (st = f ) = Prob (st = q) = 1/2. 
A node st E N is identified with a sequence {,. .., St} E {  GE if t > 1, and 
with the null sequence in the case of s?. There is a single consumption good at 
each node, and a single security is traded, a perpetuity paying a constant 
dividend forever, defined by d(st) = 1, b(st) = 1, for each st E N with t 2 1. The 
perpetuity exists in a net supply of one unit at all times. 
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The economy consists of a single representative household, with preferences 
of the form (4.1), where u() is again a bounded, increasing, concave C' 
function, defined on 
_W+. But in contrast to the preceding example, the stochas- 
tic discount factor {13(st)} is now defined by 
5 t 
13(st) + 
if s, = q for all X < t, or if t = 0, while 
8'6 
3(st) = (1 + rt [2- 8 + 2j+ '(1 + r)Jr(l - S)A] 
if s,=qn for all i<-j, but s+1 = , for some O<j<t-1. Here 0<8<1, and 
r, A > 0. Note that this specification of the discount factor process implies that 
E E7T(St) ,3(st) = -)+ /\< + oo 
t=0 st 
so that preferences are increasing and continuous in the product topology. 
The household has no endowment other than its initial endowment of the 
perpetuity, at any node after the initial one; specifically, w(s?) = 1, w(st) = 0 for 
all st with t > 1, and i(s?) = 1. It trades at all nodes st E N. Finally, its 
borrowing limit is of the form (2.8), given by B(st) = &7Th(St) = O for all st e N. 
Equilibrium is obviously unique, with the equilibrium allocation given by 
C(st) = 1 for each st E N, and with the equilibrium price process for the 
perpetuity given by 
q(st) = [3(s')u'(j(st))]1 E E T(SsTst)I3(sT)u'(j(sT)) 
T=t+1 ST 
= :(S ) E S2tT8(ST) 43(5t)1 2 
T=t+1 sT 
for each st E N. From the above specification of the discount factor process, one 
finds that 
1 
(4.4a) q(st) =- + A[2(1 + r)]t 
r 
if s,= nq for all r < t, or if t = 0, while 
(4.4b) q(st)=- 
r 
if s,= for any r<t. 
This economy satisfies at the given equilibrium all the conditions in Theorem 
3.1, but violates (A.2) in Theorem 3.3 due to the nonstationarity of the stochastic 
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discount factor. By Theorem 3.1 there must exist a state-price process in terms 
of which the price of the security equals its fundamental value. This is obviously 
true for the process 
a(s') = 218(s') 
On the other hand, there also exist other state-price processes, equally consis- 
tent with (2.1), in terms of which the price process (4.4) involves a speculative 
bubble. One such process is 
(4.5) a(s') = [2(1 + r) -t. 
This is consistent with (2.1), since the process (4.4) satisfies the stochastic 
difference equation 
(4.6) q(st) = (1 +r)1 E ir(st+1Ist)[1 +q(st+1)]. 
st+ lIst 
But in terms of the state prices (4.5), the fundamental value of the perpetuity is 
always 1/r, so that at any node st such that s, = 7i for all T < t, there exists a 
bubble component to the perpetuity's market value, equal to 
o- (st) = A[2(1 + r)]t. 
At all other nodes, the bubble component is zero. Under this interpretation, one 
observes a "stochastic bubble" of the kind discussed by Blanchard (1979) and 
many subsequent authors. There is a bubble of size A > 0 at date zero, which 
then grows at the rate 2(1 + r) if St = 7 each period. If ever st = (, the bubble 
"bursts," and is equal to zero thereafter. 
This example illustrates that the classification of solutions of the form (4.6) as 
"fundamental" or "bubble solutions" along the lines often established is not 
necessarily desirable in an incomplete markets framework. Theorem 3.3 shows, 
however, that if agents are sufficiently impatient, then there unambiguously does 
not exist a pricing bubble for those types of securities in such economies. 
A final remark is in order. One sometimes sees it asserted that a necessary 
condition for bubbles to exist is that the economy be "dynamically inefficient." 
Theorem 3.1 has something of this flavor, for in the case of complete markets 
and borrowing limits of the form (2.8), the condition that 7rW(st) < + oC for each 
St in N is a sufficient condition for Pareto optimality of equilibrium. But the 
Theorem does not say that Pareto optimality implies the absence of bubbles. 
The condition referred to is not necessary for Pareto optimality, and Example 
4.1 shows that a pricing bubble may exist in a Pareto optimal equilibrium. 
Conversely, the condition does not imply Pareto optimality in the case of 
incomplete markets or binding borrowing constraints; yet the theorem rules out 
bubbles in these cases as well. The connection between inefficiency and the 
existence of pricing bubbles is thus a rather loose one (see Santos and Woodford 
(1993) for further discussion). 
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper contains a fairly systematic study of the conditions under which 
rational asset pricing bubbles may occur in an infinite-horizon competitive 
framework. Our analysis has gone beyond the standard perfect capital markets 
paradigm, and has explored how the interaction of several conditions such as 
sequentially incomplete markets, productive assets, arbitrary borrowing limits 
and incomplete participation of agents in the entire sequence of markets, affects 
the possibility of asset pricing bubbles in a given equilibrium. These extensions 
of the standard competitive framework are commonplace in the modern finance 
and macroeconomics literatures. 
As part of our inquiry we have developed a theory of valuation of arbitrary 
income streams over an infinite horizon as a consequence of the absence of 
arbitrage opportunities. These results should be useful more generally in the 
characterization of budget sets and equilibria. Furthermore, these developments 
of arbitrage pricing theory are readily extended to account for additional types 
of frictions often proposed such as liquidity and short-sale constraints, and 
reserve requirements. 
Our main results show the nonexistence of asset pricing bubbles under fairly 
general assumptions. More specifically, if traded assets are sufficiently produc- 
tive (i.e., the aggregate endowment is bounded by a portfolio trading plan), then 
for securities in positive net supply pricing bubbles do not occur, regardless of 
the presence of sequentially incomplete markets, arbitrary borrowing limits and 
incomplete participation of households in the infinite sequence of spot markets. 
All these extensions of the basic theory may only be compatible with a pricing 
bubble in additional situations if the economy is not sufficiently productive, and 
as a result of these restrictions aggregate wealth is infinite-valued in the given 
equilibrium. It should be remarked though that under sequentially incomplete 
markets the fundamental value of a given security may not be unambiguously 
defined, and even in very simple cases a bubble may be possible for some 
state-price processes. As shown in Theorem 3.3, however, this pathology ceases 
to exist if agents are sufficiently impatient. 
These results suggest that known examples of pricing bubbles depend upon 
rather special circumstances. In consequence, familiar examples (such as the 
overlapping generations model of Samuelson (1958) or the Bewley (1980) model) 
seem to be quite fragile as potential foundations for monetary theory. For when 
these models are extended to allow for trading in additional assets that are 
sufficiently productive (in particular, capital earning returns satisfying the crite- 
rion of Abel et al.), or to include an infinitely lived household (or Barro 
"dynasty") that is able to borrow against its future endowment and that owns a 
fraction of aggregate wealth, pricing bubbles-and hence monetary 
equilibria-can be excluded under quite general assumptions. We conclude 
from this that robust monetary equilibria depend upon the presence of addi- 
tional trading restrictions. As shown in a companion paper (Santos and 
Woodford (1995)), in such kind of models the fundamental value of an asset can 
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be extended to include the shadow value of relaxation of the constraints, and in 
consequence monetary equilibria are not usefully thought of as pricing bubbles. 
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our results excluding the possibility 
of rational pricing bubbles do not imply that there should be no role for an 
effect of self-fulfilling expectations upon asset prices and equilibrium alloca- 
tions. While examples of multiple equilibria and "sunspot" equilibria are loosely 
referred to as "bubbles," there is generally no close analytical connection 
between these phenomena and the existence of a pricing bubble in our sense. In 
particular, the presence of assets sufficiently productive to ensure a finite value 
for the economy's aggregate endowment does not exclude the possibility that 
equilibrium is indeterminate, or that sunspot equilibria exist, as we discuss 
further in Santos and Woodford (1993). 
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Col. Heroes de Padiema, Mexico City D.F. 10700, Mexico 
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APPENDIX 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.2: (i) We first establish that ik(st) 2 V,,(st), where V,,(st) 
SUPa e A(s') vx(st; p, a). Let a be any element of A(st), and let z be any plan satisfying conditions 
(2.6). Then it suffices to show that 
(6.1) q(st' z(st) > vx(st; p, a). 
Multiplication of the left- and right-hand sides of (2.6a) by a(sr), and summing over srlsr- I for 
some sr- 1 yields 
a(sr-l)q(sr-l)Z(Sr-1) > E a(sr)[p(sryX(sr) + q(sryZ(sr)] 
using (2.1). Repetition of this argument for each t + 1 < r < T and each Sr 1st, for arbitrary T, and 
summing over all those nodes, yields 
T 
a(s')q(st')z(st) 2 E E a(sr)p(srYx(sr) + E a(sT)q(sSTDZ(sT) 
r=t+ 1 srls STist 
T 
> E: E a(Sr)p(SrYX(Sr) 
r = t + 1 srIs 
using (2.6b). As this bound holds for all T > t, and the right-hand side is a nondecreasing series in T, 
there must exist a well-defined limit of the right-hand side as T -4 + cc, and it must satisfy the same 
bound, so that (6.1) holds. 
(ii) Next we establish that -i (st) < Tx(st). This is only nontrivial if Tx(st) < + cc, so we assume 
that this is the case. It then suffices to exhibit a plan z satisfying conditions (2.6) such that 
(6.2) q(st)'z(st) = Dx(st). 
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We construct such plan as follows. For any srlst, consider the minimization problem 
(6.3) W(y)- inf q(sr'z 
zemk(s') 
such that R(sr+ lYz ?y(sr+ 1) for each Sr+ lIsr, where y is a specification of required wealth y(sr+ 1) 
at each of the nodes Sr+ llsr. We establish below that for the case 
Y(Sr+I ) =p(Sr+ 1)X(Sr+ 1) + V (Sr+ 1) 
this problem has a solution provided that y(sr+ )= 0 for all Sr+ lIsr such that R(sr+ 1) = 0; 
moreover, the minimized value satisfies 
(6.4) W(y) = px(Sr) ) 0. 
Let z(Sr) denote a portfolio at node Sr that solves this problem. Then the plan z given by 
Z(Sr) = 2(Sr) for each Srlst satisfies (2.6) at all nodes, and satisfies (6.2) as well. Thus (2.7a) is 
established. 
(iii) It remains to establish the existence of a solution to (6.3) that satisfies (6.4). Note that (6.3) is 
a general linear programming problem of the sort treated in Gale (1960, Ch. 3). The corresponding 
dual problem is 
(6.5) V(y)= sup k A(sr+ l)y(sr+l) 
A,Mn,(Sr) Sr+ I is' 
such that 
(6.6) k A(sr+ )R(Sr+1i =q(Sr)'. 
sr+ IIs' 
(Note that the constraints in (6.6) hold with equality because there are no nonnegative constraints 
on z in (6.3).) If y(sr+l ) = 0 for all Sr+lIsr such that R(sr+ 1) = 0, one observes that there exist 
vectors z such that R(sr+ IYz ? y(Sr+ 1), so that problem (6.3) is feasible. Furthermore, the absence 
of arbitrage opportunities implies that there exist vectors A 2 0 that satisfy (6.6); this follows from 
the existence of state prices satisfying (2.1). Hence both problem (6.3) and its dual (6.5) are feasible. 
It then follows from the duality theorem of linear programming (Gale (1960, Theorem 3.1)) that 
optima exist for both problems, and that W(y) = V(y). By continuity, the supremum in (6.5) remains 
the same if one adds the restriction that A >> 0. Thus 
(6.7) W(y)= sup E A(sr+ l)y(sr+l) 
A E A(s') s'+ lIs' 
where A(sr) is the subset of A ES+(+s) for which (6.6) holds. 
We then observe that the maximization problem defining Tx(s') implies, using a dynamic 
programming argument, that 
px(Sr) = E: A(Sr+ l)y(Sr+l 
Sr+ I Is' 
for each srlst. Comparing this expression with (6.7) yields (6.4). This completes the proof of (2.7a). 
(iv) Next we establish (2.7b). The proof is similar to that in part (i). Consider any state-price 
process a EA(s'), and any plan z satisfying conditions (i)-(ii) of the definition of - (s). Multiplica- 
tion of both sides of (2.5) by a(Sr), and summing over all nodes SrlSt with dates t + 1 < r < T, yields 
T 
E E a(sr)p(sr)'x(sr) 2 E a(ST)q(ST)'Z(sT) - a(st)q(st)'z(st), 
r=t+ 1 srIs' ST is 
This content downloaded from 128.59.154.119 on Mon, 25 Nov 2013 12:59:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ASSET PRICING BUBBLES 51 
using (2.1). But then the facts that q(STyZ(ST) 2 0 for each ST Ist, and that p(SryX(Sr) 2 0 for each 
SrISt with r > T, imply that vx(s'; p, a) 2 -q(s'Yz(s'). Then the definition of ,(s') implies (2.7b). 
(v) Finally, we establish (2.7c) under the additional hypothesis. For this purpose, we show that for 
arbitrary e> 0 it is possible to construct a state-price process ii A(S') such that vx(st; p, ) < 
f(st) + e. 
We first observe that, if T(Sr+ 1) < +0o for all Sr+ lISr then 
(6.8) ,(Sr) = min A(Sr+ )[p(sr+1)'X(Sr+l) + (Sr+ 1)] 
A Sr+ 11Sr 
where the minimization is over the set of nonnegative multipliers A satisfying (6.6). (The proof of 
(6.8) follows similar steps as that of part (iii), and it is therefore omitted; for further details, see 
Santos and Woodford (1993).) Then (6.8) holds at all SrISt under the additional hypothesis asserted 
in (2.7c), and the minimum is achieved for some set of nonnegative multipliers {A(Sr+ 1lSr)}. Hence, 
for every T1 > t there exists a nonnegative system {75(Sr+ 1 Sr)}, where ep(SrISt) is defined recursively 
as p(SrISt) =A(Sr)7,(Sr - lIs') and p(s') = 1, such that 
T, 
(6.9) IT (sI) = , E 5(Sr)p(SrYX(Sr) + E ep(STI)ff 
r= t + 1 srIs, s T Ist 
Moreover, since all terms of the form p(SryX(Sr) and (s T1) in (6.9) are finite, for every 8> 0 there 
exists a system of state prices {a(SrIst)}, defined recursively as a(SrISt) = A(Sr)a(Sr- list), for 
positive {A(Sr)} E A(Sr - 1) and a(st) = 1, such that 
T, 
I'T(St) > 2 E E (Sr)p(SrYX(Sr) + E: d(STI) ff(5 
r= t+ 1 srIs, STI Ist 
By the same argument, for an arbitrary T2> T1 and e/4 > 0 it follows that there are state prices 
{i(SrISTi)} such that 
T, 
ii(sTl)ff,(ST,) + 8 E d(Sr)p(SryX(Sr) + L a-(ST2) (ST2). 
Ti 1 ~ ~4 - rs T sT ist r=Tl+1 + Is' sT2Ist 
Proceeding inductively, we find that 
Z(st) + 8? E EZi(Sr)p(SrYX(Sr) 
r=t?1 Isrls 
which implies that Hx(st) + e 2 vx(st; p, a). This establishes (2.7c). Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.3: (i) We shall show that there cannot be an optimal plan for household 
h if Hrwh(St) = +XC for some st ENh\Nh. This will establish that z-h(St) < +00. Moreover, if 
lrWh(St) < +OC for each st E Nh \Nh, then by Proposition 2.2 the borrowing limit Bh(St) can be 
equivalently expressed as 
inf VWh(St; p, a) < +oc. 
a eA(s) 
(ii) We first observe that for each st E Nh \Nh at which 7rWh(St) = +oc, there exists at least one 
immediate successor st' at which fWh(St+ 1) = + X as well. (For if there were none, (6.8) could be 
used to show that H,,,h(St) < +oc.) For any such node st, let F(st) denote the set of immediate 
successors at which the borrowing limit is similarly infinite. It is shown below that there also must 
exist a portfolio i(St) E=_k(s') such that q(stYj(st) < 0, yet with the property that 
(6.10) R(st+ 1) z(s't) ? 0 
for all St+' lF(st). 
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Then no consumption/portfolio plan (ch, zh) can be optimal for h, since it is possible for h to 
consume a strictly greater vector at node st, without reducing consumption at any successor nodes of 
st, financing the additional consumption by purchasing a sufficient quantity of the portfolio z(s'). 
This does not violate (1.lc), given that the borrowing limit is infinite at this node. As this portfolio 
change entails that R(st+ 1Y (st) ? 0 at any successor node s" 1 F(st), it is not necessary to 
change consumption or the portfolio at any such node. Furthermore, at any successor node 
s'+1 E F(st), the borrowing limit is again infinite. Thus one can proceed iteratively to construct an 
alternative portfolio plan that satisfies budget constraints (1.1) at all nodes, in the case of a 
consumption plan that differs from ch in the increased consumption at st, and possibly at some 
subsequent nodes. Since this alternative consumption plan must be preferred by (A.1), ch is 
evidently not optimal. 
(iii) It remains to show the existence of a portfolio z(st) that satisfies (6.10). From the definition 
of ir h(St), it follows that if fW,h(St) = + oo then there exists a sequence of finite portfolios fz ),= l, 
with the property that -q(stYzn converges to +oo, as n goes to +oo, and -R(st'+Yzn ? 




Then for every ? > 0, 
q(st'z n -R(st+ 1 'Zn 
I q(st )znl = -1 and I q(st)zn l < 
for all st' l 4 F(st) and large enough n. 
Let ZA = (1,. 1) be the portfolio involving one unit of each security. Let A > 0 be such that 
q(stY(ZI/A) < 1. For n = 1,2,..., define 
zn z 
l Iq(st)'znl + A) 
Then q(stYin < 0 for all n 2 1. Furthermore, by construction, R(st+ lyjn > 0 for all st+ 1 - F(st) 
and large enough n. Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.6: Suppose instead that q(sty_h(st) exceeds the upper bound stated. Then 
there exists a portfolio trading plan z with 
(6.11a) q(s') z(st) < q(st) fh(St) 
such that the joint plan (Eh, z) satisfies (l.a) and 
(6.11b) q(sT)'z(sT) ? 0 
for all sT1St with T>t. This follows from the definition of 
-I7(uh-wh)+(st), and the fact that 
Eh(ST) < Wh(ST) + (ch - wh)+(sT). 
Then define a plan zh for the nodes ST E Nh by setting Zh(ST) = Zh(ST) except on the subtree 
STISt, where Eh(ST) = Z(sT) for STjSt such that ST E Nh \Nh, and zh(ST) = 0 for STjSt E Nh. It 
follows from (6.11b) that the substitution of 0 for z(st) at nodes ST 1St E Nh does not lead to 
violation of (1l.a). Thus the joint plan (Eh, zh) satisfies (1.la)-(1.lb). Furthermore, (6.11b) implies 
that it satisfies (l.c) at each ST E Nh \Nh as well, since Bh(sT) 2 0 at each such node. Finally, 
(6.11a) implies that (l.a) is a strict inequality for this plan at node s'. Thus it is possible to increase 
consumption at node st without lowering it at any other node, which by (A.1) must be preferred. But 
this contradicts the hypothesis that (Eh, zh) is optimal for h given prices (p, q). Q.E.D. 
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PROOF OF LEMMA 3.7: (i) We first establish that for any e> 0, there exists a date T > 0, and a set 
of state prices a EA(s') such that 
(6.12) ( ? e 
sTIst 
for all T 2 T. As pointed out in Section 2, if - (s') < + oo then - (s') < + oo as well. Proposition 2.2 
then entails that for every e> O there must exist some a EA(s') such that v'(s'; p, a) > - Ws') - e. 
Accordingly, there must exist a date T such that 
1 T 
(6.13) a(s' E 5, a(s )p(s w(S ) > (SI )-e 
r=t?1I srls, 
for all T 2 T. But the proof of Proposition 2.2 also implies that 
1 T 1 
- (SI) ? ~a(st ) E i(Sr)P(SrY02(Sr) + _ E a(ST )r (ST). 
r=t? 1 srls, (sT') 
Comparing this last expression with (6.13) shows that a is an example of a set of state prices for 
which (6.12) holds. 
(ii) It only suffices to prove the lemma for the case in which q(s'Yz(s') > 0. Given any 0 < 8 < 1, 
let 0 < a, , < 1 be two numbers such that af3 = 8. Then let M(s') be a finite subset of H(s') with 
the property that 
E: q(st) Z'(s') 2 asq(s')Yz(s'). 
hell 
(Because H(s') is countable and aggregate savings q(s'Yz(s') are finite, such a finite subset must 
exist.) Let W(st) be the number of members in the finite subset H(s'). Then it follows from (6.12) 
that there exists a date T and a EA(s') such that 
1 E iS) S)<(1-fl I2(S) 
"(St) 5TI, 
a(s ) (S') q(s 
But Lemma 3.6 implies that for any sTist, 
Eq(STYf h(ST) < E: T/-el,W h) +(ST) < ;(S,)Tw(ST) 
heH hEH 
and hence that 
(6.14) E Wh(sT) < ;(s') E a-(ST)T-(ST) < (1 -) W(s) 
5TIs' hE H STISI h E H 
STE N h 
introducing the notation, Wh(ST) = ii(sT)q(sT)y2h(sT), and it is understood that the summation of 
the first two terms is over all STIst at time T. 
By Assumption (A.1), an optimal plan for any household necessarily involves the budget 
constraint (l.a) being satisfied with equality at each node. Suppose that for any h E H(s'), we 
multiply both sides of this equation by a, and sum over all SrISI, Sr E Nh, with dates t + 1 < r < T. 
Introducing the further notation 
Ch(Sr)-a(sr)p(srYEh(sr), 
1h(Sr) = a-(Sr)p(SrYWh(Sr) 
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we obtain 
T T 
(6.15) E E C*(Sr) = E E, h(s,) + Wh(Sf) Wh(S). 
r=t+ 1 srls, r=t+ I sls, STIsI 
SrE Nh sr E Nh STE Nh 
(In cancelling all terms involving wealth in intermediate periods, we have used the restriction that 
fh(Sr) =0 at each Sr E Nh.) Because endowments are nonnegative, the left-hand side cannot be 
smaller than the sum of the two final terms on the right-hand side. Summing both sides of the 
inequality over the members of Ii(s') and using (6.14) yields 
T 
r=t1 E'' hEH Ch(Sr) 2 E Wh(S') - E E Wh(ST) 
r=t+l Sr Is'15 h E-H1 h e fi TIs' h e 
sr eNh ST ENh 
2 ?] E Wh(St) 
hEH 
2 Sa(s')q(st'Yz(s). 
As the value of aggregate consumption must be at least as large as the value of consumption by 
households in H(st), this establishes (3.2). Q.E.D. 
The theorem is then proved as follows. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1: Fixing 0 < 8 < 1, one first observes that one may select a system of state 
prices a EA(st) and a sequence of dates {T7} for n = 0,1, 2, . with To = t, Tn + I > Tn for each n, 
so that for any n and any node sTnIsI, 
Tn+ 1 
(6.16) E E E Ch(Sr) > 6a(STn)q(sTn)'z(sTn). 
r= Tn + l s5lsTn he H(s') 
The construction is recursive. Suppose, for any n 2 0, that Tn has been chosen, as well as state 
prices a(Sr) for all nodes SrlSt with dates r < Tn. (For the case n = 0, set To = t and choose an 
arbitrary normalization for a(s').) Then consider any node 5Tn. By Lemma 3.7, there exists a system 
of state prices E- A(sTn) and a date T(sTn) such that (3.2) holds, and it follows that (3.2) holds as 
well for all dates T > T(sTn). It is also possible to choose a- so that ii(STn) = a(sTn), since the 
normalization of the state prices referred to in Lemma 3.7 is arbitrary. Then choose T.,+ = 
max Tn T(sTn). The maximum is achieved because the set of nodes at each date is finite. Finally, for 
each 5Tn, extend the state prices to the nodes 5rI5Tn with dates Tn + 1 < r < Tn+ by setting 
a(Sr) = di(Sr). One may then repeat the construction, replacing n by n + 1. 
Substituting conditions (1.3a)-(1.4a) into inequality (6.16) and summing over all nodes at date T, 
we obtain 
Tn + 1 
Ea(sTn )q(sTn)z(sTn ) < 8-1 Ea(sr)p(srY)7V(sr). 
5Tn r=Tn+1 sr 
Summing over n, we then have 
00 00 
E ,a(sTn)q(sTn)Yz(sTn) < ,5-1 E Ea(ST)p(ST)Y,(ST) < +00 
n=O sTn T=t+1 5T 
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where use is made of the assumption that 
-r (s') < +00, and hence that -i (s') < +oo for t = To. Then since each term in the infinite sum on the left-hand side must be nonnegative, it follows that 
lim Ea(sTn )q(STn)'z(STn) = 0. 
n - + ?? Tn 
On the other hand, iterated application of (2.4) implies 
a(s')r(st'z(s') = E a(ST)o.(S)Tz(ST). 
sT st 
Also, by virtue of Proposition 2.1, q(sT) ? o(sT). Given that all the terms involved in these 
expressions are nonnegative, we must have ( sT)Zj(ST) = 0 for each security j traded at any node 
sTIst. Then Zj(sT) > 0 implies that 0j(sT) = 0, so that there is no bubble component to the value of 
any security in positive net supply. The same conclusion holds for the case of any security of finite 
maturity as established in Section 2. Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.8: Note first that if Nh is a finite set, (3.3) follows immediately from (6.15) 
since the final term in (6.15) must vanish for large enough T. More generally, one can bound the size 
of that term, for one can show that 
(6.17) (1 - yh)q(sT)' h(sT) <p(sT)'w(sT) 
for all ST, where yh is the factor referred to in (A.2). 
For suppose that (6.17) is violated at some 5T E Nh. Then another feasible plan for h is (rh, ph), 
defined by 
h (ST), h(ST) Ch (SI)) = (Ch (ST), Eh(ST) + fV(ST), zthh (ST)), 
Zh (ST), h(ST) Zh (sT)) = (2h (ST), yh h(sT), yh_h (ST)), 
using the notation introduced in (A.2). By Assumption (A.2), this alternative allocation must be 
preferred to (rh, 2h). Thus we obtain a contradiction, and so (6.17) must hold at all nodes. 
Substituting (6.17) into (6.15) then yields 
T 
E E Ch(s,) + (jly)) E a(s )p(s )wv(s') 
r =t+ I s'rs' STis/ 
SrE- N h STfE-Nh 
T 
2 E E nh(Sr) + Wh(SI). 
r= t+ I srls, 
SrE N' 
Now let us take the limit of each term in the above inequality as T-- + oo. The fact that 
v7(s'; p, a) < + oo implies that v,, (s'; p, a) < + oo for each h, so that the first term on the right-hand 
side has a well-defined limit equal to v,ti(s'; p, a). It also implies that vo(s'; p, a) < + oo, which in 
turn yields that v,h(s'; p, a) < + oo, so that the first term on the left-hand side has a well-defined, 
finite limit. Finally, the fact that vvWs'; p, a) < + oo, together with the assumption that f4sT) ? 0 at 
all nodes, implies that the second term on the left-hand side converges to zero. This establishes (3.3). 
Q.E.D. 
The theorem is then proved as follows. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3: Given Assumptions (A.1)-(A.2), the hypotheses of Lemma 3.8 necessar- 
ily hold for each h E H, in any equilibrium. Summing (3.3) over h, and making use of equilibrium 
conditions (1.3b)-(1.4b) we obtain 
00 
E, E E Ch(Sr) 2 a(s') vv W; p, a) + a(s')q(st) z(st). 
r=t+ I srIs' hE H(Sr) 
SrE Nh 
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Note that because of the assumption that vw(s'; p, a) < + oo, the infinite sum on the left-hand side 
must also be well-defined and finite. Then, from equilibrium conditions (1.3a)-(1.4a) it follows that 
00 
E E a(sr)p(SrYfd(Sr)z(sr - 1) , a(st)q(st)'z(st) 
r=t+ 1 srIS' 
which in turn implies 
00 
E E a(sr)p(sryX(SrlSt)Z(St) > a(st)q(st)'z(st). 
r=t+1 SrIs, 
On the other hand, Proposition 2.1 shows that the left-hand side of this inequality cannot exceed the 
right. Hence the weak inequality must actually hold as an equality, which implies that a(s'Yz(st) = 0. 
Thus we can now conclude, as in proof of Theorem 3.1, that the fundamental value must equal the 
market price in the case of any security in positive net supply or of finite maturity, for each sTlst. 
Q.E.D. 
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